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ABSTRACT
A distributed system is a collection of processors which communicate via shared mem­
ory and/or message passing over communication links. A network protocol is a collection 
of processes that exchange messages over channels in a computer network. Therefore, a 
network protocol is a specific type of a distributed system since it is somewhat loosely con­
nected and communicates with the other processes in the network via message passing over 
the communication links of the network.
A real-time distributed system is a distributed system which has strict timing constraints 
on the execution time of tasks by the processors. A hard real-time system requires that the 
termination of each task occur within a predefined time limit in order to maintain system 
integrity.
The global state of the system depends on the state of each processor in the system which 
is determined by the values of the variables and the messages contained in the channel(s) 
common to that processor. The set of global states can be split up into two categories, 
legal and illegal. A self-stabilizing system will force the system to converge to a legal state 
regardless of the current state (legal or illegal) in a finite number of steps. So, the system 
can tolerate some faults automatically without user intervention. This thesis presents self- 
stabilizing versions of the X.25 connection management protocol, X.25 flow control protocol, 
and the RFMDS system. These modified protocols are shown to be more fault tolerant and 
robust than their corresponing existing protocols.
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C hapter 1
IN T R O D U C T IO N
A distributed system consists of a set of loosely connected machines. These machines 
communicate with each other through shared memory and/or message passing in order to 
achieve a common goal. The global state of the system is the union of all of the current 
states of the local processes along with the current states of the communication channels. 
This global state is considered to be a legal state or an illegal state depending upon the 
designer’s specification of what states shall be deemed legal. A system is said to be self- 
stabilizing iff starting from some global state, legal or illegal, the system will converge to a 
legal state automatically and in a finite number of steps.
Self-stabilization in distributed systems was originally introduced by Dijkstra in 1974 
[10]. He used self-stabilization to solve the mutual exclusion problem. The system (a 
ring of processors) could have several privileges initially, but once the system stabilized, 
there would only be one privilege in the system, and this privilege would be passed around 
the system. This would continue until another perturbance occurred which increased the 
number of privileges. Since then, self-stabilization has received a great deal of attention 
since it can be used in any system where the legal and illegal states of the system are well 
defined in terms of the global states of the system.
In self-stabilizing algorithms, the algorithm that is executed by each machine is a series 
of privileges and moves. A privilege is defined to be the ability of a machine to change its 
current state. This ability is based on a boolean predicate that consists of its current state 
and the states of its neighbors. When a machine has a privilege, it is able to change its 
current state, which is referred to as a move.
The purpose of self-stabilization is that it enables a system to overcome certain occur­
rences without external intervention, for example:
•Reconfiguration  : When the system is reconfigured, the new configuration may cause 
the system state to be considered an illegal state.
•CoordinationLoss : When a process detects unexpected behavior from another pro­
cess, it realizes that coordination has been lost and thus the state of the system is illegal.
•ModeChange  : The system may be designed to execute in different modes depending 
upon the system load for example. If this is the case, some processors will be executing in 
a different mode than others at some point in time. Thus, implying that the system’s state 
has become an illegal one.
•PreventiveMaintenance  : The system may be designed to automatically initiate a 
convergence periodically just in case the system state  has become illegal due to some fault.
Self-stabilization is used to provide fault tolerance in deadlock detection and clock syn­
chronization algorithms and is proving to be an important feature in any system.
Since Dijkstra’s paper, many papers have used self-stabilization to solve the mutual 
exclusion problem. For example, a self-stabilizing token system has been presented [3]. 
Recently, self-stabilization has been used in many other areas of distributed systems and 
computer science in general. Some of these areas are mentioned in [12 ]. Self-stabilizing 
protocols have been studied [1, 2, 13]. Extensions to message passing systems [14] have also 
been studied.
When a designer creates a protocol it is with the assumption that the protocol will begin 
in a predetermined global state, so, where the initial values of the local variables in all the 
processes are known. From this point, the designer then continues to construct the protocol 
in such a way as to not allow an illegal state to be reached for this initial state, call this 
new state si. The designer then ensures that from s i, the protocol cannot reach an illegal 
state, and so on. Ultimately, the protocol is written so that starting from the initial global 
state, so, the protocol will remain in a legal state for the duration of its execution.
However, consider the case where, due to some transient error, the protocol’s state 
becomes an illegal one. A global state  is considered to be illegal if it differs from the 
intended invariant of the protocol. Notice that this case is not dealt with in the original
design of the protocol. Therefore, we cannot guarantee what actions will be taken by the 
protocol. Because of this, self-stabilization is being applied to protocols to ensure proper 
functioning in the face of transient faults.
In [13], two well-known network protocols, the sliding window and the two-way hand­
shake, are shown to be non fault tolerant in the self-stabilizing sense. The concept of a 
convergence stair is used to prove that a given protocol is self-stabilizing [13]. The proto­
col is self-stabilizing iff the global predicates listed in the stair satisfy the following three 
properties: boundary, closure, and convergence. The authors then show how to modify the 
original sliding window protocol and the two-way handshake protocol to make them self- 
stabilizing. Verification of the self-stabilizing protocols is done via the convergence stair. It 
is shown in [1] that self-stabilization of a special case of the sliding window protocol, the 
alternating bit protocol where the window size equals 1 , could be achieved using bounded 
sequence numbers for message ids. However, this protocol is pseudo-stabilizing and not 
self-stabilizing [4]. It is also shown in [13] that it is impossible to develop a self-stabilizing 
version of a protocol that uses bounded sequence numbers.
After studying the application of self-stabilization in the sliding window and the two-way 
handshake protocols in [13] and since network protocols use a connection management and 
flow control scheme, we decided to investigate the potential application of self-stabilization 
in a real world network protocol.
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces the connection 
management aspect of the X.25 network protocol, shows tha t the existing protocol is non 
self-stabilizing, and shows that the protocol can be modified to become self-stabilizing. It is 
then proven that the modified protocol is self-stabilizing via the convergence stair technique. 
Chapter 3 is identical except it introduces the flow control scheme of the X.25 network 
protocol. Chapter 4 introduces a hard real-time system and describes how self-stabilization 
can be applied to make the real-time system more robust and fault tolerant. Chapter 5 
summarizes the conclusions of the thesis and elaborates on future research possibilities.
C hapter 2
X .25 C onnection  M anagem ent
A distributed system consists of a set of loosely connected machines. These machines 
communicate with each other through shared memory and/or a message passing system. 
A network protocol is a  collection of processes that exchange messages over channels in a 
computer network. Therefore, a network protocol is a  specific type of a distributed system 
since it is somewhat loosely connected and communicates with the other processes in the 
network via message passing over the communication links of the network.
In this chapter, we will examine an aspect of the X.25 communications protocol at the 
network layer [5], the connection management aspect.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.1 describes the original 
protocol and gives the pseudocode for the sender and receiver processes along with variables 
and notation. Section 2.2 gives the self-stabilizing version of the protocol after defining the 
legal states. Section 2.3 verifies that the algorithm is correct using a convergence stair, and 
finally, Section 2.4 gives an example of the algorithm at work.
2.1 X .25 C onnection  M anagem ent D escrip tion
The connection management aspect of the X.25 network protocol the virtual circuit mode 
works as follows: let D T E S, D T E r represent the sender’s D T E  and receiver’s D T E , respec­
tively. D T E  (D ata Terminal Equipment) refers to the terminals or computers in a network 
and D C E  (D ata Circuit-Terminating Equipment) refers to the modems. In order for pro­
cess s to establish a connection with process r, process s sends a call —request message from 
D T E S to D T E r . If D T E r replies with a call — accepted message, the connection is estab­
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lished and the channel is now ready for full-duplex data transmission. On the other hand, if 
D T E t replies with a clear — request message, D T E S sends a clear — confirmation  back to 
D T E r upon receipt of the clear — request message. The connection is then terminated. To 
terminate the connection, D T E S sends a clear— request message to D T E t . D T E t responds 
by sending a c lear-con firm a tion  to D T E S. After D T E S receives the clear —confirmation  
message both processes, s and r, realize the connection is terminated.
In the above description, the intermediate communication between the D T E  and the 
D T E / D C E  interfaces has been purposely omitted as it our intent to give only a general 
overview of the connection management scheme. Furthermore, the description is sufficient 
to allow explanation on how the self-stabilization property could be incorporated into the 
existing X.25 protocol.
The following protocol represents the connection management scheme for the X.25 net­
work protocol. The variables in both processes sender and receiver are defined as follows:
2.1.1 Variables
Ss represents the state of the channel selected by D T E S with possible values of:
• data-transfer  : The connection has been established and the channel is ready to  accept 
data tranmission.
• waiti : The connection request has been sent out by D T E S and the sender is waiting for 
a reply.
• wait2  : A disconnect request has been sent out by D T E S and the sender is waiting for a 
reply.
• ready : The channel is idle and available for use.
M r represents the possible messages that the sender can receive in response to a request:
• clear .request : The receiver rejects the request made by the sender.
•calljaccepted : The receiver accepts the request made by the sender.
•clear-confirmation : The receiver okays the request to disconnect made by the sender.
ST represents the state of the channel selected by D T E S and D T E r '-
• da taJransfer : The connection has been established and the channel is ready to accept 
data transmission.
•wait2 : The receiver has rejected the request sent by D T E S and is waiting for a reply.
• ready : The channel is idle and available for use.
M,, represents the possible messages that the receiver can receive as a request or reply in 
the case of a clear.confirmation:
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•calljrequest : The sender requests that a connection be established.
•clear jeon f irm a tion  : The receiver rejected sender’s request for connection establishment 
and sent out a clear .request to D T E ,.
•clear.request : The data transfer is complete, and the sender wants to disconnect.
The channels in the system are:
Csr '■ This is the channel which contains the messages sent 
Crs ■ This is the channel which contains the messages sent
A tim eout is used in the protocol. If the sender times 
and the sender retransmits the message.
2.1.2 O riginal X .25  P rotocol
The receiver and sender processes are as follows:
process sender3 repeat 
(.Ss =  ready) — ►
send (calljrequest) to r;
S 3 := w aiti ;
(S 3 =  dataJransfer)  —  ̂ {the data transfer is complete}
send {clear .request) to r;
S s := waity,
(recv(M r)) — y
if  M r = calljiccepted then  S 3 := data.transfer;  
else if M r = clear.request then  
sand(clear co n firm a t io n );
S 3 := ready, 
elseif M r = clear.confirm  then  S 3 := ready,
(tim eout(5s = wait\ V wait2) A (Csr =  C T3 -  <f>)) — ► 
if  S 3 =  waiti then
send (call.request) to r\
S 3 := wait2 ',
e lse if S 3 = waiti then send (clear.request) to r\
forever;
process receiverT(M S) 
repeat
(recv(M s)) — ►
if M g = calljrequest then
(send(calljiccepted) to s; Sr data .transfer-, )V 
(send(clear.request) to s; Sr '■= waiti',) 
elseif M s = clear .confirmation  then  S T := ready, 
elseif M 3 = clearjrequest then
send(clear.confirmation) to s;
from the sender to the receiver, 
from the receiver to the sender.
out, then the message was lost,
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Sr := ready ;
forever;
We have purposely omitted the D T E /D C E  interface in the sample protocol for sim­
plicity although self-stabilizing the complete connection management system of the X.25 
protocol would require the same approach.
2.2 Self-S tab ilization  o f th e X .25 P ro to co l
2 .2 .1  Legal S ta tes
The global predicate P l  describes the legal states of the protocol. If at any time the 
protocol’s variables and/or channels do not conform to P l , the global state is considered to 
be an illegal one.
P l :
( Ss =  ready  A {{Sr = ready A Csr = Crs = <f)
V ( ST =  wait? A Csr =  {clear jeon f i rm a t ion )  A Crs = <p)))
V {Ss =  dataJrans fer  A Sr =  dataJransfer  A Csr = Crs =  4>)
V {Ss = waiti A {Csr =  Crs = 4>
V {Sr = ready A CST = {call-request)  A CTS =  <t>)
V {Sr =  dataJransfer  A Car =  (j> A C’r3 =  {calljiccepted))
V (5V =  wait'i A ((C sr = 4> /\ Crs = {clear.request})  V Csr =  Crs =  <£))))
V ( 5 S =  wait2 A (Csr =  Cr3 =  4>
V (5V = dataJransfer  A Csr =  {clear_regue.st} A C r3 =  d>)
V ( i 'r  =  ready A C 3r =  <f> A C r3 =  {clear-confirmation})
V (5V = ready  A Csr =  {c/ear.re^uesi} A Crs = 0))) 
For the self-stabilizing version of the X.25 connection management scheme (discussed 
in Section 2.2.3), the global predicate differs slightly from P l . The only difference is that 
the messages in the channels now have an integer id associated with each of them. The 
necessity for tagging each message with an id will be shown later.
2 .2 .2  P ro o f o f N on  Self-S tab ilization
In order to show that the sample protocol is not self-stabilizing we need to show a case 
where starting at some illegal state , 5b, we cycle through other illegal states, Si, S2, S3 , ... 
, Sn, by the execution of actions within the protocol until we arrive back to Sq. Since this
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is a cycle we can say that starting at the illegal state So, the protocol will not converge to a
legal state in a finite number of steps. Therefore, proving the protocol is not self-stabilizing.
Counterexam ple:
Assume that the initial state of the system is So.
50 = {Ss =  ready A Sr = dataJrans fer  A
CST — {clear-request}  A Crs =  { call-accepted} )
51  =  {Ss =  waiti  A Sr =  dataJransfer  A
Csr =  {clear-request-, calljrequest} A Crs — {call.accepted})
5 2 =  {Ss = da taJrans fer  A S'r =  dataJrans fer  A
Csr — {clear-request', call .request}  A CTS = (j))
53  = (Ss = da taJrans fer  A S r = ready A
C sr =  {calljrequest}  A C „  =  {clear-confirm})
54  = (Ss = wait2 A SV =  ready A
C sr = {call-request', clear-request}  A C rs = {c/ear_c(m/zYm})
5 5  = (Ss = wait2  A £V =  dataJransfer  A
C sr =  {clear-request}  A C rs =  {clear jeon firm-, call jiccepted})
The following state transitions yield a cycle of illegal states:
50 —■> S 1 via action 1 in process s
51 —>■ S 2 via action 3 in process s
5 2 S 3  via action 3 in process r
53 —► S 4  via action 2  in process s
54 —> S 5 via action 1 in process r
55 -* So via action 5 in process s
The above sequence shows a case where starting at some initial illegal global state, the 
protocol fails to converge to a legal state within a finite amount of time. Therefore, the 
protocol is not self-stabilizing. The reason the sequence appeared is because of the faulty
initialization.
2.2.3 Self-S tab ilizing  V ersion
The earlier protocol has been shown to be non self-stabilizing. Once the coordination 
between the sender and receiver is lost the processes can not regain coordination.
For the X.25 protocol, when the system is in a legal global state  there is at most one 
message in the system at any time. Let I (  denote the actual number of messages in the 
channel at a given time. It is possible that, due to some system fault, K  > 1 messages may 
reside in the channel at a given time. In this case, the global state is an illegal one since 
K  > 1. If the protocol is self-stabilizing, the system must converge to a legal global state 
within a finite number of steps. This implies that the number of messages in the channel 
must eventually be reduced so tha t K  < 1 .
In order to accomplish the above goal, the protocol given in Section 2.1.2 is modified to 
tag an id to each message in each channel. Also, checks were placed in the sender process 
to make sure that the reply which is received agrees with the state of the sender. The 
message id, iVs, is used by the sender so tha t messages with the wrong id are ignored. Once 
the sender receives a valid reply, the message id that will be used for the next request is 
incremented. Eventually, the ids in the system will all be lower than the new id. Once this 
occurs, all other messages will be ignored because they have the wrong id.
process senders 
repeat
(Sa = ready) — ►
send(calljrequest,N3) to r;
Ss := waiti 
(Ss = da taJransfer)  — ►
send (clear.request, N s) to r;
S3 := wait2 ;
(rec v (M r,N ) )  — ►
if N  ^  N s then  nop;
e lse if MT = call .accepted A S s = waiti then  
Ss := dataJransfer;
N s := N s +  1; 
e lse if M r = calljaccepted A S s waiti then nop; 




N s := N s + 1; 
elseif M r =  clear .request A S 3 ^  waiti th en  nop; 
e lse if M T =  clear.con f i r m  A Ss = wait2 then  
S s := ready,
N s := N s + 1; 
elseif M r =  clear.con f i r m  A S s wait2 then  nop;
(tim eou t(5s = waiti V waitf) A (CST — C r 3  =  <j>)) — ► 
if S 3 = waiti then
send{call.request, N s) to r;
S 3 '.= waity,
else if S 3 = wait2  then  send (clear.request, N s)to r; 
forever; process receiverT 
repeat
(rec v (M s,N ) )  — ►
if M s = calljrequest then
(send (callMccepted, N ) to s; Sr := data.transfer)
V (send (clear jrequest, N )  to s; S r '■= wait2) 
e lse if M s = clear .confirmation  th en  Sr := ready 
e lse if M s =  clear.request then
send (clear.confirmation, N ) to s m,
Sr ■= ready, 
send {clear .request, N )  to s forever;
Notice tha t although the receiver sends messages on a channel there are no checks to 
make sure that the state is correct for the reception of the message from s. The reason is 
because if there were checks and Sr was incorrect due to some system fault, process s could 
get into an infinite time-out loop since no reply would ever be sent out by r.
2.3 V erification o f th e  Self-S tab ilizing X .25 P rotocol
In [13], two protocols were changed in order to be stabilizing, the two-way handshake and the 
sliding window protocol. In order to verify that the algorithms were indeed self-stabilizing, 
a convergence stair is presented. This stair is a sequence of global predicates, P j, P2, ..., Pn. 
The authors proved that a protocol is self-stabilizing if and only if it satisfied the following 
three conditions [13]:
1) Pi =  true and Pn = Pl,
2) Each P,- is closed.
3) P,- converges to P;+i for i < n.
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The first condition is called the boundary condition. The first predicate is true and 
the final predicate is the set of legal states. The second condition is closure. Closure 
means that any action executed in a state which satisfies Pi will also satisfy P,-. Finally, the 
third condition is convergence. Starting from the state true, any set of actions eventually 
converges to a legal state, Pn. The predicate true  holds for an arbitrary initial state. This 
stair shows that any initial state will converge to a legal state.
The convergence stair for the self-stabilizing version is:
T h e o rem  2.3.1: The convergence stair satisfies the three conditions of boundary, closure, 
and convergence.
Boundary: This is immediate since Pi =  true  and P5 — P^.
Closure:
(a) The closure of Pi is immediate.
(b) If P 2 holds, any message sent by the sender with counter i, will either have i = N s — 1 
(the third send followed by N s = N s +  1 or i — N s (all other sends in the process sender). 
No m atter which send causes a message to appear in Csr, the message will have an id less 
than or equal to  N s.
(c) If P3 holds, P3 will continue to hold. The only way in which the receiver process sends 
a message is by replying to a message sent by the sender. This reply message has the same 
id as the received message. Since P2 holds, The reply message must have an id less than or 
equal to N s-
(d) If P 4 holds in state s, show that any move will cause a state, s ' , in which P4 also holds. 
If there is a message in Csr, then f ( s ) must be 0 so Ss ^  ready and S 3 ^  dataJransfer.
There can not be a message in the channel CTS. So, the sender is not privileged to make
P i  =  true
Pi — Pi h (V M s(i) € CST,i  < N s)
P3 =  P 2 A (V M r(i) € C r s ,  i <  N s)
Pa = Ps A ( 0  <  \ C Ts\ +  |C sr| +  / )  < 1)
Ps = Pl
1 i f S s =  ready V S s = da taJrans fer  
0 otherwise
P ro o f:
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any move (S 3 ^  ready, S 3 ^  dataJransfer ,  there is no message to receive, and there is 
no timeout possible since the channels are not empty. The receiver can only receive the 
message and send another message. This action can not change the value of the function f 
since Ss does not change. So, 0 < |C3r| +  |Crs| +  f ( s ' )  < 1 .
If there is a message in Crs, then again, f ( s )  = 0. The receiver process is not privileged 
since it can not receive a message (Csr = <j>), and it can not timeout (both channels are 
not empty). Since / ( s )  = 0 , S 3 ^  ready and Ss ^  da taJrans fer ,  the only privilege which 
the sender has is to receive the message. Now, both channels are empty, and the maximum 
value of the function is 1 , so 0  < |Csr| +  |Crs| +  f ( s ' )  < 1 .
If f (s )  =  1 , then the channels must be empty, and either Ss = ready or Ss = 
dataJransfer .  The sender process sends a message and changes to a wait state. After 
this, |Csr| =  1 , but f ( s ' )  =  0, so 0 < |C7sr| +  \Crs\ + f ( s  ) < 1 .
(e) If P$ holds, the system is in a legal state, and the system will remain in a legal state 
until an error occurs.
Therefore, each step in the convergence stair is closed.
Convergence:
(a) Pi — ► P2 : Initially, there are messages in CST. These messages will eventually be 
received by the recever process and will no longer be in this channel. The sender process 
only sends messages with an id of N s. After the message is sent, N s either stays the same 
or is incremented. In either case, the message sent will be less than or equal to the current 
value of N s. After the messages initially in the channel are read by the receiver, all messages 
in the channel C3T will have an id less than or equal to N s.
(b) P2 — ► P3 : After all messages in the Csr channel have a value less than or equal to N 3, 
there may be messages that are in channel CT3 which are greater than this value. However 
once these messages are read by the sender, they are just ignored (N  ^  N s). Eventually, 
only new replies will be in Crs. All of these new replies will have an id less than or equal 
to N s.
(c) P3  — > P4  : The first step is to show that eventually, there is at most one message 
in the channels. The system is in a P3 state. If the sender sends a message because of 
one of the first two actions where the id is N s, this message will be put in the channel
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and Ss = waiti  V wait2. The receiver replies to messages as it receives the messages. 
As soon as the sender receives a reply with the correct message id, it will increment N s 
(Ss =  waiti V wait2). Now, all the other messages in the channel are invalid (all ids are 
less than the new Ns).  When the invalid messages are received by the receiver, replies 
will be made by the receiver, but these replies will be ignored by the sender (wrong id). 
Eventually, the correct id message will be received (Csr will be empty at this point). The 
reply will be made, and all messages on CT 3  will be ignored except for this one reply. Once 
all other messages are eliminated, there will be exactly one message left. This message can 
be received, and another can be sent, but the number of messages will never be greater than 
one.
Now, f ( s )  must be considered. When there is one message in the system, eventually 
this message will be received. The receiver just replies. In order for f ( s )  = 1 , Ss = 
ready V dataJLransfer. If this is the case, |Csr| +  C rs + f ( s )  =  2 since there is a message 
in Crs■ If tbe message in Csr is received, there will be no messages in the channels and P4 
holds. The other case is that the sender sends by one of the first two actions ( /( s )  = 1). If 
this is the case, Ss is changed, and / ( s i )  =  0 , but there are two messages in the system. If 
the message in Crs is received and is ignored, P4 will hold. If the message in Crs is received 
and is not ignored, Ss can be changed so that f ( s 2) = 1 . But, the other message (in Csr) 
will now have the wrong id because N s is incremented. When the reply reaches the sender, 
it will be ignored. So, this message can be ignored and 0 < |Csr| +  |Crs| +  f ( s )  < 1 .
(d) P4 — ► P5 : Once P4 holds, either f ( s )  =  0 or f ( s )  = 1 , and the message that can 
exist will be originated by the sender process. The reason it isoriginated by the sender is 
because the messages in the channels initially will all be received, and the receiver does 
not initiate messages. It is easy to show that the system will reach a global state. Two 
cases folow: if f ( s )  = 0 then there must be a message in one of the channels (or the 
timeout will send a message since Ss = waiti  V wait2). Once the message is received and 
replied to by the receiver, assume that the message has a valid id, otherwise, it will be 
ignored and a correct message will be sent eventually. If the sender receives a calljrequest , 
Ss = Sr = dataJrans f e r  and this is a legal state since the channels are empty. If it receives 
a clear .request then Ss =  ready A Sr = wait 2 A CST — {clear.con f irmat ion}  A Crs = <j)
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which is a legal state. The other cases are similar. No m atter which actions are taken, a 
legal state will be reached.
Boundary, closure, and convergence have been shown for the protocol. □
2.4 E xam ple o f Self-S tab ilization
The original X.25 protocol is not self-stabilizing. A counterexample was given in Section
2.2.2. This section shows how starting from the same initial state, the system stabilizes to 
a legal state. Two example executions are given. There are more possibilities, but all of 
them will result in a legal state being reached eventually.
E xam ple 1:
50 — (Ss = ready A Sr =  dataJrans fer  A
C ST =  {clear-.requests} A C TS =  {call-accepteds})
5 1 =  (Ss =  wait\  A ST =  da taJrans fer  A
C sr = {clear-request^ calljrequests}  A C rs  =  {calljiccepteds})
5 2  =  (Ss — dataJrans fer  A ST =  dataJrans fer  A
C ST = {dear.requests', call j-equests] A C rs = <j>)
5 3  — (Ss = dataJrans fer  A Sr =  ready A
CST — {call-requests} A Crs = {clear.confirms})
=  (Ss = dataJrans fer  A S r = ready A 
C sr =  {call.requests] A C rs =  </>)
S 5  = (Ss = da taJransfer  A S r — da taJrans fer  A 
C Sr =  <t> A C rs  =  {calljaccepteds})
Se = (Ss — dataJrans fer  A S r = da taJrans fer  A 
C s r  =  C Ts =  9-0
Ss S 1 via action 1 in process s
51 —*■ S 2  via action 3 in process s
5 2 ~  S3  via action 3 in process r
5 3  —► 5.J via action 3 in process s
5.i —*■ S 5  via action 1 in process r
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Ss —*• *5*6 via action 3 in process s
iSg is a state given in Pl - Therefore, Sh is a legal global state of the system. This 
example is used to show that, starting at some initial illegal state So, the enhanced protocol 
now converges to a legal state within a finite number of steps.
Exam ple 2:
So =  (S s =  ready A S r — dataJransfer  A
Csr =  {clearjrequesti)  A Crs =  {call Jiccepteda})
S\ = (Ss = ready A ST =  dataJransfer  A 
Csr = {cl ear-request i}  A CTS — <fi)
5 2 =  (Ss =  ready A S r =  ready A
CST = (j> A C rs =  { clearjconfirmationx} )
5 3  =  ( S s  =  ready A Sr — ready A
C ’s r  " “  4*)
50 —>■ Si via action 3 in process s
51 —*■ S2 via action 3 in process r
52 —*■ S3 via action 3 in process s
53 is also a legal state denoted in Pl . This example demonstrates another possible path 
of execution from So-
There are more paths of execution, starting from So, for the protocol to select than shown 
above. However, they are dealt with similarly and will result in the system’s convergence 
to a legal global state.
This chapter presented a self-stabilizing version of the X.25 communication protocol. 
All that is examined is the connection management aspect of the protocol. The original 
protocol required the system (sender, receiver, and channels) to be properly initialized. The 
necessity of the initialization is shown by an example which gives a cycle of states which 
do not satisfy the legal states of the protocol. The self-stabilizing version does not need an
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initialized system. If the channels contain too many or the wrong messages, the system will 
converge to a state where there is at most one message between the sender and receiver (a 
request or a reply).
The self-stabilizing version of the protocol can tolerate errors such as processor or link 
failures and restarts. This fault tolerance makes the self-stabilizing version of the protocol 
more robust than the original version. The idea of self-stabilizing protocols has been used in 
stabilizing the alternating bit protocol [1], and the sliding window and two-way handshake 
protocols [13]. The protocol which is self-stabilized in this chapter is the X.25 connection 
management protocol.
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C h ap ter 3
X .25 Flow  C ontrol
After connection has been established between two nodes in the network by the X.25 con­
nection management scheme, the channels, between which the two nodes are located, are 
considered to be in a data. transfer  state. It is within this state only, that flow control 
related packets may be transm itted and received by the sender and receiver, respectively. 
The flow control related packets are those packets which contain data, information pertain­
ing to the sender and/or receiver’s window (w ), or messages pertaining to the status of the 
channels currently being used for data  transmission.
In this chapter, we will examine an aspect of the X.25 communications protocol at the 
data link layer [5], the flow control procedures.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1 describes the original 
protocol and gives the pseudocode for the sender and receiver processes along with variables 
and notation. Section 3.2 gives the self-stabilizing version of the protocol after defining the 
legal states. Section 3.3 verifies that the algorithm is correct using a convergence stair and 
Section 3.4 gives an example of the algorithm.
3.1 X .25 Flow C ontrol D escription
The flow control aspect of the X.25 network protocol, virtual circuit mode, works as follows: 
let D T E S, D T E t represent the sender’s D T E  and receiver’s D T E , respectively. D T E  
(D ata Terminal Equipment) refers to the terminals or computers in a network and D C E  
(D ata Circuit-Terminating Equipment) refers to the modems. After the virtual circuit 
connection has been established, the channel on which the connection is established is
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placed in a data. transfer  state. Upon entering this state, the channel will be placed in a 
f low.ready  state immediately by the flow control process. Process s sends data messages of 
the form data(Ps{S)) where P3 (S)  is the send message sequence number. Process r receives 
these messages and acknowledges the receipt by sending acknowledge messages of the form 
ack(Pr( R )) to s where Pr{R) is the receive message sequence number acknowledging receipt 
of the message Pr{R) - 1  down to LPS(R ) + 1  where LPS(R ) is the last acknowledge received 
by s for r.
To control the flow of data from D T E S to D T E r , process s is restrained to sending at 
most w messages without receiving an acknowledge from r. The constant w, w > 1 , is 
called the window size.
The description above omits the intermediate communication between the D T E  and 
D T E / D C E  interfaces for simplicity and clarity of the protocol. The description given is 
sufficient to allow explanation on how self-stabilization can be applied to the existing X.25 
flow control protocol, which is the focus of this chapter.
The following protocol represents the flow control mechanism for the X.25 network 
protocol. The variables in both processes sender and receiver are defined as follows:
3 .1 .1  V ariab les
The variables of process s are defined as follows :
•PT3 {R) : The sequence number of the current packet transmitted to s by r.
• LP3( R ) : The sequence number of the last packet received by s from r.
• P3( S ) : The sequence number of the packet sent by s.
• R N R 3 : The flag indicating that a receive not ready message was received from r.
• R E T R A N S s : The sequence number of the oldest packet to retransmit.
S 3 represents the state of the channel selected by D T E S with possible values of :
• f low.ready : The virtual connection has been established and the flow control process is 
ready to transfer data on the channel.
• wait  : A reset.request  has been sent out by D T E S and the sender is waiting for a reply. 
Mdte(s) represents the possible messages that the sender can receive as input from its D T E
•reject  : The sender requests retransmission of one or several consecutive data  packets. 
This corresponds to a timeout operation.
Mt represents the possible messages that the sender can receive from process r :
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• ack(Prs( R )) : The receiver acknowledges receipt of data(Prs(R) -  1) down to, but not 
including, LPS(R ), the next acknowledge expected by the sender.
• R N R ( P rs(R))  : The receiver notifies the sender that it is temporarily unable to receive 
frame Prs( R ) and any subsequent frames.
• RR(Prs{R )) : The receiver notifies the sender that it is ready to receive the w packets 
within the window starting with Prs(R).
•reset .confirmation  : The receiver acknowledges the reset request sent out by s. 
•reset.request  : The receiver initiates reset of the logical channel due to some error.
The variables of process r are defined as follows :
• Pr(R ) : The sequence number of the data packet sent out by r  to s.
• Psr( S ) : The sequence number of the packet received from s.
• R N R r : The flag indicating a RNR was received from D T E r.
Sr represents the state of the channel selected by D T E S and D T E r-
• f low.ready  : The virtual connection has been established and the flow control process is 
ready to transfer data on the channel.
• wait : A  reset .request  has been sent out by D T  ET and the receiver is waiting for a reply. 
Mdte(r) represents the possible messages that the receiver can receive as input from its D T E
• R N R ( P r{R)) : The receiver is temporarily unable to receive frame Pr(R)  along with any 
other subsequent frames.
• RR(Pr(R)) : The receiver is ready to receive the w packets within the window starting 
with Pr(R)-
M 3 represents the possible messages that the receiver can receive from process s:
• data(Psr( S )) : The sender transm itted a data packet with sequence number Psr{S ) to r. 
•reset.request : The sender requested reinitialization of the virtual call due to some error.
• reset-conf irmation : The sender confirms the request to reinitialize by r.
The channels in the system are:
CST : This is the channel which contains the messages sent from the sender to the receiver. 
CTS : This is the channel which contains the messages sent from the receiver to the sender.
3.1.2 O riginal X .25 P rotoco l




( - ‘R N R s  A (P$(S) < LPS(R)  +  w) —  
if  S s = f lowjready  then
send (data(Ps(S))) to r;
Ps(S) : = P s(S) + 1; 
else send (reset.request) to r; Ss := wait 
(rec v ( M d t e ( s ) ) )  — ►
if Mdie(s) =  r e j e c t ( R E T R A N  S s) then { timeout } 
if  ( - ^ a c h i n g  A (C s r < r s  =  </>))then
if  ( L P S ( R )  <  R E T R A N S s <  P s ( S ) ) then  
for i  =  R E T R A N S s , P s ( S )  -  1 
sen d (data(i)) to r 
endfor
else send(reset.request) to r; 5S := wait; 
(rec v(M r)) — *
if Mr = acA;(Prs(ii)) then  
if  =  f low.ready  then
if  L P S( R )  <  P r s ( R )  <  P . ( S )  then  
L P S( R )  :=  P „ (P ) ;  
else send(reset_re<7 uesf) to r; 6̂  := wait; 
else  send(reset .request) to r; := wait 
e lse if M r =  R N R ( P TS( R ) )  then  
if  S 3 =  f lowjready  then  
R N R S := T R U E ;
L P S( R )  :=  P r s ( R ) ;
P s ( S )  :=  P r s ( R ) \  
else send(reset_re^uest) to r; 5S := wait 
e lse if M r =  R R ( P r s ( R ) )  then  
if  S s — flowjready  then
if  ( R N R s ) then  R N R S : =  F A L S E ;  
L P s ( R )  := P r s ( R ) \
P , ( S )  : =  P r s ( R ) ;  
else send(reset_reguest) to r; S s ■— wait 
e lse if M r =  reset.conf irmation  then  
if  S s = wait  then  S 3 ' ■= flow.ready;  
else send(r'eset_re9 tiest) to r; S s ' ■ =  wait 
e lse if M r =  reset.request  then  
if  S s — flowjready  then
send (reset.conf irmation) to r;
S s := flow.ready;  
else send (reset.request) to r; Ss ' ■ =  wait 
(tim eout((53 = wait) A (Csr = CTS = <j>) A (-racking))) —  





(recv(M die(r))) — ►
if Md<e(r) = R N  R(Pr(R))  then  
R N R r := T R U E ; 
send ( R N  R(Pr(R))) to s; 
elseif = RR(Pr(R))  then
i t  (RNRr)  then  R N R r := F A L S E ; 
send (RR(Pr(R))) to s ;
(rec v j ¥ s ) — ►
if M s = reset.request then  
if  ST = f low.ready  then
send (reset.confirmation)  to 5 ;
Sr := f low.ready;  
else send (reset.request) to s; Sr := wait 
elseif M s = reset .conf irmation  then  
if  Sr =  wait th en  S T := flow.ready;  
else send(reset.request) to s; Sr '■= wait 
elseif M s = data(Psr( S )) then  
if Sr = f low.ready  then  
if (->RNRr ) then
acking := TRU E;
if i ( P r ( R )  <  P s r ( S )  <  P r ( R )  + w) A P s r ( S ) = P r ( R ) )  then  
P r ( R )  :=  P r ( R )  +  1; 
else send (reset.request) to s; S T : =  wait; 
else send (reset.request) to s; S T wait 
(tim eout((5r = wait)  A ( C s r  =  Crs =  0 )  A (-lacking)))  — > 
send (reset.reqyest) to s; S r := wait 
(acking) — >
send (ack(Pr(R))) to s; 
acking := FAL SE;
forever;
We have purposely omitted the D T E / D C E  interface in the above protocol for simplicity 
however, self-stabilizing the complete flow control process of the X.25 protocol would require 
the same approach presented in the following section. Note that a reset will also set the 
window related to each direction of data  transmission to 0  and the numbering of subsequent 
data packets will begin at 0. Also, all of the packets in each direction of the network are 
removed (ignored).
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3.2 Self-Stabilization  o f th e  X .25 P rotocol
3 .2 .1  Legal S tates
The global predicate Pl describes the legal states of the protocol. If at any time the 
protocol’s variables and/or channels do not conform to jPi, the global state is considered to 
be an illegal one.
Pl -
((5 S =  f low.ready  A S r = flow.ready)
A( (LPS(R) < Pr(R)) A (Pt(R ) < Ps(S))  A (Ps(S)  < LPS(R)  +  u>)
A (for each data(i) £ Csr : i < Ps(S))
A (for each ack(i) 6  Crs : i < Pr(R))))
V(5S =  wait  A [Csr = CTS - o  
V(Sr = f low.ready  A CST = {reset.request} A Crs = <j>) 
y ( S r — f low.ready A Csr = d A Crs = {reset .conf irmation}))
)
V(5S =  f low.ready A (Csr = Crs = f>
V(ST = wait  A CSr = <t> A CTS =  {reset.request})
V(5r =  wait A Csr = {reset .confirmation} A Cra =  </>))
)
)
For the self-stabilizing version of the X.25 flow control process (discussed in Section 
3.2.3), the global predicate is identical to Pi .  The reason being is that the modification 
involved only additional error checking. Modification to any of the messages or the logic in 
which messages are tagged was unnecessary to stabilize the protocol.
3 .2 .2  P ro o f o f N on Self-S tab ilization
In Chapter 2, we proved that the sample protocol given in that chapter was not self-
stabilizing by showing a case where starting at some illegal state , So, we cycled through
other illegal states, S\, S 2 , So, ... , Sn, by the execution of actions within the protocol until 
we arrived back to Sq. Since this was a cycle we correctly stated that starting at the illegal 
state So, the protocol will not converge to a legal state in a finite number of steps. Thus, 
proving the protocol was not self-stabilizing.
In this chapter however, we will show that the sample protocol given is not self-stabilizing 
by presenting a case where starting at some initial illegal state, So, we cycle through other 
illegal states,Si, S 2 , S3 , ... , Sn, where Sn is a terminating state(no actions enabled in
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s or r). Since the protocol terminates in an illegal state, we can say that the protocol 
will not converge to a legal state in a finite amount of steps or more appropriate for the 
circumstances, a finite amount of time. Therefore, the protocol is not self-stabilizing.
Counterexam ple:
Assume that the initial state of the system is So and due to a transient fault, w =  - 1  
in the sender process only.
5 0  =  (Ps{S ) =  0 A LPS{R ) =  2 A Pr(R ) = 0 A -*RN R  A -racking
A C Sr — Crs = 4*)
51 = (Ps(S) =  1 A LPS( R ) = 2 A Pt{R) = 0 A ->RNR A racking
ACsr = {data(0 ) }  A CTS = <f>)
5 2 =  (P s (S )  = 1 A LPS(R) — 2  A Pr(R) = 1 A - i R N R  A acking
ACsr = Crs <̂ )
53 =  (Ps( S ) =  1 A LPS{R) = 2 A Pr{R) = 1 A ->RNR A -racking
f\CST = <t> A Crs =  {acA:(l)})
S., =  (Ps(S) =  0 A LPS(R) = 0 A PT{R) = 0 A ->RNR A -lacking 
ACsr = CTs — 0)
The following state transitions show the traversal of the protocol from one illegal state 
to another until it converges to a state in which no action is enabled in either process s or 
process r:
50 Si via action 1 in process s
51 —*• S2 via action 5 in process r
52 —i► S3 via action 6  in process r
53 —i► S.i via action 3 in process s
The above sequence shows a case where starting at some initial illegal global state, the 
protocol fails to converge to a legal state within a finite amount of time. Therefore, the
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protocol is not self-stabilizing. The reason the sequence appeared is because of the faulty 
initialization. In the protocol described in the following Section, we will show that it will 
converge to a legal state within a finite time irrespective of the initial state of the system 
in which execution begins.
3 .2 .3  S e lf-S ta b iliz in g  V ersion
The earlier protocol has been shown to be non self-stabilizing. Given a faulty initial state, 
the protocol executed incorrectly and eventually reached a global state in which no action 
was enabled in the protocol.
In the flow control aspect of the X.25 protocol, the legal states of the system must satisfy 
the constraint, Ps( S ) < LPS{R) +  w, as well as others, when both S s = ST = f low.ready.  
This constraint will always be satisfied unless, due to some transient error, w < 0 in the 
sender process. In this case, Ps(S ) < LPS(R ) + w will not hold for the duration of the 
session as shown in the counterexample given in Section 3.2.2. In order that the protocol 
be considered self-stabilizing, the system must converge to a legal global state in a finite 
number of steps, implying that w must eventually become greater than 0. Also, in the 
case where a reset request has been made, the total number of messages that can reside in 
both channels at any given time is 1 . Let K  denote the total number of messages in both 
channels at a given time. If K  > 1 , due to an error, the state  of the system is illegal. If 
the protocol is self-stabilizing, it must be able to reduce the number of messages in each 
channel so that K  < 1.
In order to accomplish the above mentioned goals, the protocol given in Section 3.1.2 
is modified to check the value of w upon each entrance into process s. If to < 0 then to 
is reassigned its agreed upon value. In the case where the users have negotiation facilities, 
renegotiation of to may take place at that time.
As far as adding checks in the sender process to ensure that the reply received agrees 
with the state of the sender, it has already been done in the original version of the flow 
control process. There is no need to tag the reset.request and reset.confirmation  messages 
as we tagged similar messages in the connection management aspect of the X.25 in Chapter 
2 since these messages can not cause permanent loss of coordination between s and r  by
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cycling through some sequence of the messages in a way to continually generate illegal 
states (see [13]’s example on why an infinite number of safe states are needed). However, to 
prevent unnecessary resetting of the virtual circuit, we will tag an id to the reset messages 
in each channel as done in Chapter 2 .
p rocess sender3 
re p e a t
if w < 0 th e n  w = 7; { reset window size }
( ^ R N R S A {Ps(S) < LPS( R ) +  w) —  
if Ss = flowjready  th e n
s e n d (data(Ps(S))) to r;
P s { S )  P s { S )  +  1; 
else se n d (reset.request(Ns)) to r; S s '•= wait 
( recv (M dte{s))) — ►
if M dte[s} = r e je c t ( R E T R A N  S s) th e n  { timeout } 
if  (-racking A (CSTtTS =  $ ))th e n
if (LPS(R) < R E T R A N S s < Ps(S ))then  
for i = R E T R A N S s, Ps( S ) -  1 
send(data(i)) to r 
end fo r
else send(reset-request(Ns)) to r; Ss wait]
(rec  v (M t )) — ►
if M r — ack(PTS(R))  th e n
if  S s = f lowjready  th e n
if L P s ( R )  < P r s { R )  <  P s { S )  th en  
L P s ( R )  :=  PTs(R); 
else send  {reset jrequest{N s)) to r; Ss wait ; 
else send(reset jrequest(Ns)) to r; S s '■= wait 
e lseif M r — R N R ( P r s ( R ) )  th e n  
if  S s = f low.ready  th e n  
R N R S :=  T R U E ]
L P s ( R )  : = P r s ( R ) ]
P s ( S )  : =  P r s ( R ) ]  
else send(reset .request(Ns)) to r; S s ■= wait 
e lse if M r = R R ( P Ts ( R ) )  th e n  
if  S s = f low.ready  th e n
if ( R N R s ) th e n  R N R S := F A L S E ]  
L P s ( R )  : =  P t s ( R );
P s ( S )  : = P r s ( R ) ]  
else send  {reset .request{Ns)) to r; S s := wait 
e lseif M r — reset .conf irmation(N)  th e n  
if S s = wait th e n
if N  =  N s th en S s := flow.ready] N s := N s + 1 
else nop
else se n d (reset.request(Ns)) to r] Ss ■— wait
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e lse if  M r = reset.request(N)  then  
if Ss — f lowjready  then
send(reset .conf irmation(N))  to r ; Ss '■= f low.ready ; 
e lse  send (reset.request(Ns)) to r; S s := wait 
(tim eou t((5s =  wait) A (C Sr - C TS =  cf>) A (racking)))  — *■ 




if w < 0 then  w = 7; { reset window size }
(recv(M dte(r))) — >
if Mdie(r) =  R N R ( P T( R ) )  th e n  
R N R r : =  T R U E ; 
send(iZA^/2(Pr(i2))) to s; 
e lse if M^iefr) = R R ( P r ( R ) )  th e n
if  ( R N R r )  then R N R r := F A L S E ;  
sen d (RR(Pt (R))) to s ;
(rec v M s) — ►
if M s = reset.request(N)  then  
if  Sr = flowjready  then
send (reset.conf irmation(N)) to s;
S T := flow.ready;  
e lse  send(reset .request(Nr)) to s; Sr := wait 
e lse if M s =  reset .conf irmation(N)  then  
if  ST = wait then
if N  =  N r then6V := f low.ready; Nr := N r +  1 
else nop
else send(reset .request(Nr )) to s; Sr := wait 
e lse if M s =  data(Psr(S)) then  
if  Sr =  f low.ready  then  
if  (-iR N R r) then
acking := TRU E;
if ((Pr(R) <  Psr(S) <  Pr(R) + w )  A PST(S) =  Pr{R)) then  
Pr(R) -.= Pr(R) + 1; 
else send(reset .request(Nr )) to s; Sr '•= wait; 
else  sen d (reset.request(Nr)) to s; S r '■= wait 
(tim eout((5'r =  wait) A (C ST = C TS -  d>) A (racking)))  — > 
send(reset .request(Nr )) to s; Sr ■= wait 
(acking) — ►
send(acA;(Pr(i2))) to s; 
acking := FA L SE ;
forever;
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3.3 V erification o f th e Self-Stabilizing X .25 P rotocol
In [13], two protocols were changed in order to be stabilizing, the two-way handshake and the 
sliding window protocol. In order to verify that the algorithms were indeed self-stabilizing, 
a convergence stair is presented. This stair is a sequence of global predicates, Pi ,P2, — , Pn- 
The authors proved that a protocol is self-stabilizing if and only if it satisfied the following 
three conditions [13]:
1 ) P\ — true and Pn = Pl
2) Each P{ is closed.
3) Pi converges to P ,+i for i < n.
The first condition is called the boundary condition. The first predicate is true and 
the final predicate is the set of legal states. The second condition is closure. Closure 
means that any action executed in a state which satisfies P; will also satisfy P,-. Finally, the 
third condition is convergence. Starting from the state true,  any set of actions eventually 
converges to a legal state, Pn. The predicate true holds for an arbitrary initial state. This 
stair shows that any initial state will converge to a legal state. Note that P5 — > P7 assume 
that S 3 A ST C data.tr ans f  er(f low .ready V wait) since the flow control process is entered 
only when this is the case. If this were not the case then it would imply that the virtual 
connection has not been completed and thus we could not possibly transmit data.
The convergence stair for the self-stabilizing version is:
Pi = true
P2 = Pi A (V rset 3 (i) £ Csr : i < (N s V Nr))
P3 =  P2 A (V rsetr(i) £ Crs ■ i < (Ns V Nr))
Pi = P3  A (0 < |rsefs £ Csr| +  |rsefr £ CTS\ +  / )  < 1)
P5 = P4  A (LPS(R) < P3 (S))  A (Ps(S) < LPS( R ) +  w)
Pe = Ps A (Pr(R) < Ps( S ))
A (for each data(i) £ C3T : i < PAS))
A (for each ack(i) £ C r 3  : i < P3 {S))
P7  = P&h (LPS( R ) < Pr(R))
A (for each ack(i) £ Crs : i < Pr(R))
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Ps = Pl
t( \ — J i fS s  = f low .ready A Sr = f lowjready  
' 0  otherwise
rsets refers to either a reset.request  or reset .conf irmation  
sent by process s 
rsetr refers to either a reset.request  or reset .conf irmation  
sent by process r
T h eo rem  3.3.1: The convergence stair satisfies the three conditions of boundary, closure, 
and convergence.
P roo f:
Boundary: This is immediate since Pi = true and Pz = P l - 
Closure:
(a) The closure of P\ is immediate.
(b) If Pi holds, any reset.request  or reset.confirmation  sent by the sender with counter 
i will have i =  N s(reset.request) or i = N r{reset.confirmation).  No m atter which send 
causes a message to be added to Csr, the message will have an id less than or equal to N s 
or ATr-
(c) If Pz holds, Pz will continue to hold after a send by the receiver. Any reset mes­
sage sent by the receiver with counter i will either have i = Nr{reset.request) or i = 
N s(reset.conf irmation).  As with Pi , no m atter which send causes a message to be added 
to Crs, the message will have an id less than or equal to N r or N s.
(d) If P4  holds in a state sq? we wih show that any arbitrary move by s or r  will result in a 
state s j , where P4  still holds.
If there is a message in CST, then /(so) = 0 which implies Sr = S s ^  f low.ready  or 
ST ^  Ss . Also, there can not be a message in CTS. So, the sender is not privileged to make 
any move since there are no messages in CTS to receive and there is no timeout(retransmit) 
possible since CST ^  <f). The receiver is able to respond to this message. If the message is a
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reset .conf irmationST becomes flowjready.  Now, Csr = CT3 =  <f> and the maximum value 
of the function /  is 1, so 0 < |rsefs € CST\ +  \rsetT G Crs| +  f ( s \ )  < 1.
If there is a message in CTS, the case is the same as for a message in CST since both the 
sender and receiver have the same ability to initiate and respond to reset-related messages.
If f ( s ) = 1 , the channels must be empty and Ss — Sr = f lowjready.  The sender or 
the receiver may send a reset.request message and it will change the state  of the sending 
process, either s or r, to wait. After this, either |rse tr G CTS\ =  1 or \rsets G Csr| = 1 
implying that / ( s i )  = 0. So, 0 < |rse ts G Csr| +  \rsetT G CTS\ +  f { s i )  < 1.
(e) If P5 holds, any move by the sender process will result in a state in which P5 remains 
true. The values of LPS( R ) and Ps{S) are modified by the sender process, s, only. Since P5 
holds initially, LPS(R) < Ps{S). Upon the receipt of ack(Prs(R)), LPS( R ) is given the value 
of Prs(R ) only if LPS{R ) < Prs(R)  < Ps(S)  which yields a state where LPS(R) < Ps(S). 
Upon receipt of a R N R ( P rs(R)) or R R (P TS(R))  message from r, both LPS(R)  and Ps{S) 
are assigned the value of PTS(R).  Thus, yielding a state where LPS( R ) < Ps(5) still holds.
If Ps(S ) is modified by a send data, Ps(S) < LPs(R)+w  must be true. So, the worst case 
is when Ps(S)  = LPs(R) + w -  1 prior to the incrementation of Ps( S ) by 1. This still yields 
a state where Ps(S) < LPS(R) + w. Also, upon receipt of a R N R ( P rs(R))  or RR(Prs(R)) 
from r, both LPS(R)  and P3 (S)  are assigned the same value. Thus, Ps(S) < LPS{R) + w 
holds.
(f) If Pq holds, any move by either process will result in a state in which P& still holds. 
Pr(P ) is modified by the receiver only and P s ( S )  is modified by the sender only. Upon 
receipt of data(Psr(S)),  the receiver increments P T{ R )  if PSr{S) -  P r ( R ) .  If this is the case, 
at that time P s ( S )  = P r ( R )  + 1 but after the evaluation of the if check P T( R ) =  P s ( S ) .  So, 
P r { R )  < P s { S ) holds after the only move that could affect the relationship of Pr (P ) and 
P s { S ) .
Only the sender places data in Csr■ If the sender adds data(i) to Csr by the first action, i 
must be less than Ps{S) since Ps( S ) is incremented by 1 after data(i) is added to the channel. 
If the sender adds data(i) to Csr by retransmission, i must be less than Ps(S)  because of the 
if check, LPS( R ) < R E T  R A N  Ss < Ps(S),  and the fo r loop, i = R E T  R A N  SS) Ps(S)  — 1. 
So, every data(i) G Csr, i < Ps{S).
30
Only the receiver puts data in Crs. An ack(i) is put on the channel only if Psr( S ) = 
Pt {R). If that is true then at that time Pr(R) = Ps(S)  — 1- So, Pr(R) < Ps( S ) still 
holds but after the if check is evaluated to true, Pr{R) =  Pr(R)  +  1 is executed and now 
Pr(R) = Ps(S). So, the ack(i) added to CTS has the value i =  Pr{R) =  Pa(S).  So, every 
ack(i) G Cr3, i  < Ps(S)  holds.
(g) If P7  holds then any action will yield a state where P 7  still holds. If r sends an ack(Pr(R))
to s then s will update LPS(R) only if LP 3 ( R ) < Prs (R ) < Ps(S).  Since the initial state 
was P7, LPS( R ) < Pr(R)  and so we know th a t LPS(R ) is not greater than Pr{R).  Since 
Pr(R ) is incremented by 1 before each transmission of an acknowledge, the ack(PT(R))  that 
was just sent will have a sequence number, Pr(R),  which is at least 1 greater than LPS(R).  
So, LPS(R ) < Pr( R ) holds. If $ receives a R N R ( P rs(R))  or RR(Prs(R))  from r, LPS( R ) is
assigned the value of PTS(R). So, LPS(R ) < Pr(R)  will still hold.
Pr[R) is modified by the receiver only. Each ack(i) put on the channel is put there only 
after i is incremented by 1 . The value of i is equal to Pr(R)  at the time ack(i) is put in 
Crs- So, for each ack(i) € Crs, i < Pr(R ) holds.
(h) If Ps holds, the system is in a legal state and will remain in a legal state until and error 
occurs that forces it into an illegal state.
Therefore, each step in the convergence stair is closed.
Convergence:
(a) Pi — ► P2  : If there are no resets in the system initially, Pi has converged to P2 by 
definition of P2 . However, if there are reset-related messages in the system initially, these 
messages will eventually be received by r  and will no longer be in CST. The sender process 
may either send a message with an id of N s(reset.request)  or N r{reset .confirmation).  Af­
ter the message message is sent, N s is incremented by 1 or stays the same(sender responding 
to a resetjrequest sent by r). The messages initially in Csr may have values greater than 
N t . If so, they will be ignored by r  since N  ^  N r. For either case, the message sent will 
have an id of i < (N s V N r). After the messages initially in the channel, if any, are received 
by r, all of the messages in CST will have an id of i < (N s V N r).
(b) P2 — ► P3  '■ Again, if there are no resets pending initially, P2 has converged to P3 
by definition of P 3 . However, if there are resets in the system initially, the reasoning for
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Pi — ► P2 applies except for the receiver process rather than the sender.
(c) P3 — > P4 : The first step is to show that eventually there is at most one message in the 
channels. If the sender sends a reset .request with an id of N s, this message will place the 
channel in a wait state. So it is not possible to add to the channel until a timeout  occurs or 
the expected reply message is received. The receiver will receive the messages for s. If, upon 
receipt of a message from s, the state of CTS does not agree with the message received, the 
virtual circuit is reset and all packets are dropped from both CST and Crs in conjunction 
with the windows for both s are r being reset to 0 . However, if the state of Crs agrees 
with the message received then the receiver will respond. If there are confirmations in CST 
and if the sequence id of the message is correct and Sr is correct, r will increment N r and 
Sr := f lowjready , otherwise r ignores the messages. If the message was the correct one, all 
of the remaining confirmations in CST, if any, are incorrect(ids are less than N r) and will 
be ignored by r . Eventually all of the confirmations will be received by r, leaving Csr — <j> 
considering only confirmations. If there are requests in Csr, confirmations associated with 
the requests are sent to  s. The sender will respond to the confirmation if the sequence 
number of the confirmation is correct and Ss is correct. If so, Ss := flowjready  and then 
increment N s, otherwise s ignores the replies. If the message was the correct one, all of the 
remaining confirmations in Crs, if any, will be ignored by s (N  ^  N s). Eventually all of the 
requests in CST will be received by r and all of the corresponding confirmations in CTS will 
be received and ignored by s.
The same reasoning holds for the receiver since both s and r have the same mechanism 
for adding to their respective channels and receiving from each others channel.
Once all other messages are eliminated, a message can be sent and responded to, but 
the number of messages will never be more than 1.
Now consider / ( s ) .  When there is one message in the system, eventually this message 
will be received. If / ( s )  =  0, P3 has converged to P4 a t this point since there is at most 
one message in the channels. Suppose f ( s )  — 1 , this implies Ss = Sr =  f lowjready.  If this 
is the case, \rsets 6  CST| +  |rsetT 6  Crs| +  f ( s )  = 2 since |rse tr E Cr i | = 1. If the message 
in CTS is received, |rse ts E C^rl +  \rsetT E Crs | +  /(>si) =  1 since Crs -  CST = <j>■ Thus P4 
holds.
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Suppose s sends a message before the message in C rs is received. If so, the message sent 
must be a reset.request , then Ss = wait and f ( s i )  =  0 but there exists 2 messages in the 
system. If the message in C rs  is received and ignored, P4 will hold. If the message in C rs 
is received and not ignored, Ss will be changed so /(S 2 ) =  1 and N s is incremented. The 
message just sent in s will now contain a sequence number less than N s. So when the reply 
reaches s it will be ignored. So, 0 < \rsets G C s r | +  \rsetT G C r s | +  f{s-i) < 1- Thus P4 
holds.
The above argument holds for the case where the one message in the system is in C sr 
rather than C r s -
(d) P4 — ► P 5 : P4 immediately satisfies a preliminary requirement for P5 to hold, S3 = 
S T = f lowjready.  Since P5 through P^ require that Ss = Sr = flowjready  for data 
transmission, 0 < |rset 3 G CST| +  \rsetT G Crs| +  f ( s )  < 1 will be satisfied only when 
|rsefs G Csr| = \rsetT G CTS\ = <f>.
Now consider an arbitrary number of data packets and acknowledges in C sr and C r s , 
respectively. If LPS( R ) > Ps(S),  due to some error, then a send data(Ps(S)) will occur since 
Ps(S) < LPS(R) + w will be true. When the ack(Prs(R))  corresponding to that data packet 
is received by s, it will be found tha t Prs(R) < LPS(R ) which implies LPS(R) was greater 
than Ps( S ) at the time dataPs( S ) was transmitted. Though it is possible that Ps(S)  may 
equal LPS(R)  at this time, LPS{R) > Ps(S) at the time of the transmission of data(Ps(S)).  
This will result in a reset and thus LPS(R) < Ps(S)  will hold.
If Ps( S ) > LPS( R ) +  w, due to some error, then Ps(S)  must be greater than LPS(R) 
since w > 1 . Since Ps( S ) > LPS(R),  a tim eo u t retransmission will occur and data(i), 
where i = Ps(S ) -  1, will be the last packet retransm itted by s. If it is the case that 
Ps(S) = LPS(R)  +  w +  1 when Ps[S) < LPS(R) +  w was violated then upon retransmission 
it is possible that the receive data  if  check will evaluate to  true(providing the error did not 
affect the variable Pr(R)).  In which case, the protocol will enter a state where Ps(S) < 
LPS(R) + w upon receipt of ack(Prs(R))  for the message with sequence number Ps( S ) — 1. 
If it is not the case that Ps{S) =  LPS(R) -f w +  1 when Ps(S)  < LPS(R) + w was violated 
(Ps(5) > LPS(R) +  w +  1) then the last retransmitted packet will have a sequence number 
outside the window of r. Thus, causing a reset of the virtual circuit which will cause
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Ps(S) < LPa(R) + w to hold.
Realize that in the above paragraphs for Part (d), it is assumed that only the sender 
is affected by the error. It is possible that an error could have affected the receiver in a 
similar manner in which coordination between s and r is not lost even though the values of 
the local variables were modified. In this case, although highly unlikely, the protocol will 
continue to execute properly with P 5 holding true.
(e) P5 — > P6 : Since P5 holds, LPa(R ) < Ps(S). Only the sender and receiver can modify 
Ps(5) and Pr (il), respectively. LPS( R ) =  Ps{S) when an ack(Pra(R )) is received by s for 
data(Psr(S))  and at that time LPS(R) =  Pr (P ). If another data(PST(S))  is sent afterwards 
Ps(S ) = LPS(R)  +  1 which implies Ps( S ) = P r(P ) +  1- Upon receipt of data(PST(S))  by
r, Psr( S ) =  Ps(5) -  1 =  Pr{R). Ps(S)  = Pr(R) after Pr (P ) is incremented by 1 . So,
Pr{R) < Ps(S)  holds.
Data is put on Csr by process s only. It is put on in the form data(Ps(S)). Ps(S) is always 
incrementing except in the case of a reset. In the case of a reset P& will hold immediately 
following the reset since all of the data  in both channels is dropped. If there are no resets 
then we can say that for each data(i) € CST, i < Ps(S) because after data(Ps(S )) is placed 
on the channel Ps{S) is incremented by 1 . So, eventually after all initial messges are received 
by r, all of the remaining messages will have a sequence number of i < Ps(S).
Each ack(P-(R)) put on Crs is in response to a data(PST(S))  sent by s, where Psr(S) < 
Ps(S). Upon receipt of data(Psr(S)), ack(Pr(R) + 1 ) is put on the channel if Psr(S) = Pr(R)- 
Since after each send of a data packet Ps(S)  is incremented, PST( S ) is always at least 1 less 
than Ps(S). If it is acknowledged, PT(R) -  PSr { S ) prior to Pr (P ) being incremented by
1 . So, after the incrementation of Pr (P ), Pr(R ) < Ps(S)- So, eventually after all initial
acks are received by s, all of the remaining acknowledges will have a sequence number of 
* <  Ps ( S) .
(f) Pq — ► P7 : We know that Ps{S) > LPS(R)  and Ps{S) > PT{R) by P5 and Pq, respec­
tively. These were shown to hold in each of their respective predicates by explanation of 
the ack and send  actions in r and s. Looking at the ack action in r, we can see that 
upon receiving data{Psr{S)), if Psr{S) =  Pr(R ) then Pr(R) = Pr(R)  +  I- At this point, 
Pt{R) > LPS{R). After s receives ack(PTS(R)), LPS(R) = Pr(R). In the case of R R  or
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R N R  messages, LPS(R) := Pr (P ). So, LPS(R) < Pr(R).
Each ack(Pr(R))  put on CTS is preceded by an increment of Pr(R) and since we know 
each ack(i) £ Crs : i < Ps(S) by Pe, each message i in CT3 has either the same sequence 
number as its predecessor(the message put on Crs just before i) or a sequence number 
greater than its predecessor (up to Ps(S)).  This tells us that the sequence number of the 
messages in CT3 are in ascending order from head to tail of the channel. Because of this and 
the fact that we know each ack put on the channel has a sequence number derived from 
Pr(R), each ack(i) £ CTS '■ i < Pr(R)-
(g) P7 — ► P§ : This is immediate since the conjunction of Pi — ► P7 encompass every legal 
global state of the flow control process and we have shown convergence from Pi — ► P7. 
Boundary, closure, and convergence have been shown for the protocol. □
3.4 E xam ple o f Self-S tabilization
The original X.25 protocol is not self-stabilizing. A counterexample was given in Section
3.2.2. This section shows how starting from the same initial state, the system stabilizes to 
a legal state.
Example :
Assume that the initial state of the system is So and due to a transient fault, w = — 1. 
Process s will reset w to 7 immediately.
50 ~ (Ps(S ) =  0 A LPS(R)  = 2 A Pr(R) =  0 A -<RNR A racking
f \ C Sr  —  EVs —“
51 = (Ps(S ) = 1 A LPS{R) = 2 A Pr(R) = 0 A - iR N R  A racking
ACST = {data(0)} A Crs = 4>)
52 =  (P s(S ) =  1 A LPS(R)  = 2 A Pr(R)  = 1 A ~^RNR A acking
h C ST -  C T s  =  0)
53 = (P s(S ) = 1 A LPS(R) = 2 A Pr(R) =  1 A -1 R N R  A -racking
ACsr = <f> A Crs = {acft(l)})
54 =  (P s(S ) =  0 A LPS{R ) = 0 A Pr(R)  =  0 A ~>RNR A racking
AC sr — Crs ""
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The following state transitions show the traversal of the protocol from one illegal state 
to another until it converges to the now legal state, S 4 .
So —*■ Si via action 1 in process s
S\ —► S 2 via action 5 in process r
5 2 —* S 3  via action 6  in process r
53  —»■ S 4 via action 3 in process s
The processes function just as before for this example but now since w was identified 
as being in error and reinitialized, 6 4  is no longer a state in which no action in s or r is 
enabled (illegal state). The self-stabilizing protocol demonstrates the ability to overcome 
the weakness found in the existing protocol. Although there were checks in the protocol 
to determine that LPS{R) was greater than Ps(S), proved in the convergence proof for 
P4 — ► P5 in Section 4, the reset of the virtual circuit forced convergence to the then illegal 
state, fui*
This chapter presented a self-stabilizing version of the X.25 communication protocol. All 
that is examined is the flow control aspect of the protocol. The original protocol required 
the system (sender, receiver, and channels) to be properly initialized. The necessity of the 
initialization is shown by an example which gives a cycle of states which does not satisfy the 
legal states of the protocol. The self-stabilizing version does not need an initialized system. 
If the channels contain too many or the wrong messages, the system will converge to a state 
where Pl is satisfied, regardless of the initial state of execution.
The overhead related with resetting the virtual circuits is negligible, considering that 
the network reliability is fair. However, the philosophy of a  process trying to catch up when 
it is lagging behind, originated in [13], can be implemented.
Instead of resetting the virtual circuit immediately when the window synchronization is 
lost, the protocol can be redesigned to use the go back n technique. So upon synchroniza­
tion loss, the sender continues to transmit the remainder of the w packets. After that the 
sender will eventually time out. At that point, reset the virtual circuit and then retransmit
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the outstanding packets. This will prevent a loss of data  packets.
The non self-stabilizing sample protocol given in [13] was unrealistic in its simplicity. 
This chapter has shown that a real world application of the sliding window is implemented 
to be substantially more fault tolerant initially. This is why our self-stabilizing protocol 
has only slight modifications over the existing X.25 flow control protocol. Also, the self- 
stabilizing protocol presented in [13] will fall victim to the counterexample given in 3.2.2. 
It too will terminate improperly in the state S4 .
The self-stabilizing version of the protocol can tolerate errors such as processor or link 
failures and restarts. This fault tolerance makes the self-stabilizing version of the protocol 
more robust than the original version. This chapter has shown that self-stabilization can 
be incorporated into existing network protocols to enhance their fault tolerant capabilities.
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C h ap ter 4
H ard R ea l-T im e S ystem
A distributed system is a collection of processors which communicate via shared memory 
and/or message passing over communication links. A real-time distributed system is a 
distributed system which has strict timing constraints on the execution time of tasks by the 
processors. A hard real-time system requires that the termination of each task occur within 
a predefined time limit in order to maintain system integrity. If this time limit is exceeded, 
at the next interrupt for that particular task to begin executing, the current execution of 
is aborted and execution will be resume at the beginning of the task. Whereas, in a soft 
real-time system the tasks are given a priority of execution (an order in which they are 
assigned to a processor for execution) and will execute to their proper termination (not 
aborted).
A widely used method to enhance a real-time system’s fault tolerance is to provide 
redundant processors running concurrently with the main processors. In the event of a 
processor’s failure, the corresponding redundant processor’s data is used. In [8 , 11], some of 
the works which present algorithms that provide a method for dynamically allocating tasks 
to a changing topology of processors
Recently, [6 , 7] presented a model of a run time environment for specifying and monitor­
ing real-time constraints. This model provides an excellent means for detecting constraint 
violations in real-time systems.
In this chapter, we will apply self-stabilization to a hard real-time system and show 
that the new system is more robust and fault tolerant than the non self-stablizing version. 
So, rather than simply monitoring the execution of the real-time system, we will force
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convergence of the system to its intended invariant upon detection of an error.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1 describes the current 
RFMDS real-time system and its timing constraints. Section 4.2 describes the execution 
within the CCS and discusses possible errors which could severly disrupt system perfor­
mance. Section 4.3 gives the modified self-stabilization version and explains how this version 
combats the errors mentioned in Section 4.2.
4.1 R F M D S D escription
The hard real-time system we are analyzing in this chapter is a real-time system used to train 
military aircrews. This system, known as the Red Flag Measurement and Debriefing System 
(RFMDS) [9], consists of six CPUs making up the Computational and Control Subsystem 
(CCS). This subsystem receives aircraft downlink data from the Tracking Instrumentation 
Subsystem (TIS), a range over which the aircrafts fly, via an AIS pod every 10msec for up to 
36 High-Activity participants. An Aircraft Instrumentation Subsystem (AIS) pod interfaces 
with the aircraft’s weapon bus to provide weapon fire indications. The AIS pod also provides 
aircraft position data as well as aircraft orientation data. High-Activity participants are 
those aircrafts which are placed within the first 36 positions by the System Operator Console 
(SOC) operator and they have the capability to downlink data (i.e. weapon data, aircraft 
position data, etc.) to the TIS. The TIS in turn passes the data received from the aircraft 
to the CCS. All of the aircraft data received and processed by the CCS is passed to a 
Display and Debriefing Subsystem (DDS) every 100msec. This subsystem provides a graphic 
representation of the data passed to it by the CCS.
Due to the scope of this chapter, we need not go into any greater detail about the 
capabilities of the RFMDS system and the data it receives and/or provides since we have 
disclosed enough general information to allow explanation on how the existing system could 
be enhanced by self-stabilization. In this chapter, we are focusing our attention on the CCS 
portion of the RFMDS because it is this subsystem which is vulnerable to transient errors 
which could cause improper system execution for the duration of the session.
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4.1 .1  T im in g /S y n c h r o n iz a tio n  S ch em e
In the CCS there are six CPUs, as we mentioned earlier. Within each of the CPUs there 
resides a number of tasks which are executed at run-time. Each CPU runs its tasks concur­
rent with the other CPU tasks, providing a distributed environment responsible for data 
collection, interpretation, manipulation, and transfer to the DDS.
Synchronization of 1 /0  activities and response to real-time situations are accomplished 
through the use of interrupts. The Executive CPU task receives an interrupt from the 
TIS Enhanced Memory Access Multiplexor (EMAM) every 10msec signaling the start of a 
10msec frame. This is the basic timing control over the CCS program modules.
Direct Input/O utput (DIO) interrupts control the execution in the Filter, Target, Sup­
port, Weapon, and EW CPUs. The Executive CPU task writes to the DIO in each of these 
CPUs via its own DIO causing an external interrupt in the receiving CPU. This interrupt 
causes the OS to tTap to  the controlling routines in the task and signals the start of process­
ing of frames (every 10msec) or cycles (every 100msec). The Filter, Support, and Target 
CPUs receive a DIO interrupt every 10msec whereas the Weapon and EW CPUs receive a 
DIO interrupt every 100msec.
Each of the tasks residing in the CPUs and APUs is responsible for processing a segment 
of the data to be passed to the DDS every 100msec. Therefore, each task must complete its 
processing within a certain constrained period of time in order to maintain data coordination 
and thus, proper system execution.
4.2 E xisting  System
The way the CCS accomplishes coordinated building of the data buffers to be sent to 
the DDS is by the use of the up link  tra n sm it and dow nlink  tra n sm it tables. These 
tables represent the sequence in which an aircraft is interrogated (i.e. selected as the next 
participant to downlink data to the TIS) by remotes on the TIS range and the sequence 
in which an aircraft is expected to downlink data to the CCS, respectively. The tables 
are stored as two 4 X 10 dimensional arrays indexed by (cycle, frame) where frame 6  in 
all cycles of the uplink transmit is reserved for calibration frames used to monitor data  
reliability (see Figure 4.2.1a). The same holds for frame 10 in all cycles of the downlink
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transmit table (Figure 4.2.1b). A -1 element represents an empty frame (i.e. no uplink 
nor downlink messages created during that cycle/frame). A non zero element, other than 
-1, represents a position of a high activity participant acid. Figure 4.2.1 shows what the 
tables should look like when the CCS is in coordination with the TIS under a load of 13 
participants. It represents a legal configuration of the transmit tables. P i  denotes a legal 
configuration of the transmit tables (0 < i < 39). Any state in which P i  does not hold is 
considered an illegal state.
Pl -
(('iacid(i) £ uxmtable A 'iacid(j) 6  dxmtable :
— 1 < acid(i) , acid(j) < 36 A 
acid(i) = acid(j), where j  — i + 40 4)
A(V1 < acid(i) < 36 £ uxmtable  A VI < acid(j) < 36 £ dxmtable : 
acid(i) =  acid(j) A acid{i) ^  acid(k) for all k ^  j ,  
where j  = i + 40 4)
A(Vacid(i) — 0 £ uxmtable f\\/acid(j)  =  0 € dxmtable :
acid(i) = acid(j) for i = 6,16,26,36 only, 
where j  = i + 40 4)
)
As the system runs, every 10msec an element corresponding to the current frame and 
cycle is fetched from the table and used as an index into a multitude of arrays throughout 
the CCS. For example, if the current frame and cycle were 7 and 1 respectively, downlink 
would be expected to  contain the podid for the high activity participant in position 3  since 
podfd(aczci(cycle/frame)) equals podid(3). Notice that the downlink table is offset by four 
frames compared to the uplink table. The reason for tha t is that it allows for the time it 
takes the uplink message to be created and sent to the TIS by the CCS. It also accounts 
for the time it takes for the CCS to receive the response from the interrogated aircraft.
In this real-time application, the sytem protocol is not considered completely defined 
until the participant data is received from the SOC. It is at this time, the coordination 




1 2 3 4
1 1 2 3 4
2 10 11 12 13
3 -1 -1 -1 -1
4 -1 -1 -1 -1
F ra m e
5 6 7 8 9 10
5 0 6 7 8 9
-1 0 -1 -1 -1 -1
-1 0 -1 -1 -1 -1
-1 0 -1 -1 -1 -1
(a)
Cycle
1 2 3 4
1 -1 -1 -1 -1
2 6 < 8 9
3 -1 -1 -1 -1
4 -1 -1 -1 -1
F ra m e
5 6 7 8 9 10
1 2 3 4 5 0
10 11 12 13 -1 0
-1 -1 -1 -1 -1 0
-1 -1 -1 -1 -1 0
(b)
Figure 4 .2 .1 .(a) Uplink Transm it Table For 13 High A ctiv ity  Participants
(b) Downlink Transm it Table For 13 H igh A ctiv ity  Participants
These tables are used by many modules within different tasks running under various 
CPUs. Some examples are FOV.FTN e TGT.TSK, RDITISIN.FTN € XEC.TSK, PSQ- 
TRAP.FTN 6  SUP.TSK and WSIDCOS.FTN £ WPN.TSK just to name a few.
Consider RDITISIN (Figure 4.2.2), the variable expectac contains the aircraft id ex­
pected to be downlinked which was derived from the downlink transm it table according to 
the current frame and cycle of the system. Now, suppose that due to some system fault the 
table no longer satisfies P i  at the time of the derivation of expectac. Also, suppose that the 
downlinked data from the aircraft was correct (ie. no errors occurred in data transmission) 
and that it was actually the downlink expected. Looking at the code in Figure 4.2.2, sub­
routine RDIDNLNK, a routine which is called to unpack downlink data from an aircraft, 
will not be called for that (cycle/frame) position although it should have. Thus, the system 
is not executing properly since it ignores a good downlink. The CCS would continue to exe­
cute improperly each time for that cycle and frame throughout the duration of the exercise.
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Repeatedly dissallowing any data for tha t aircraft to be unpacked unless the aircraft was 
deleted from the system via the SOC operator or another perturbance occurred which set 
the table correctly. Of course, the latter is highly unlikely. This example demonstrates a 
significant weakness in the existing system due to its vulnerability if erroneous values cause 
Pl  to not hold for the transmit tables, 
su b ro u tin e  RDITISIN
global v a r  dxmtable, cycframe, acpodid, dlpodnum, tisin;
local v a r expectac;
begin
expectac := dxmtable(cycfram) ; { store expected aircraft id from table } 
dlpodnum := tisin(2 ,tinbuf) ; { store downlinked pod id }
if (expectac < 1 ) th e n  { calibration frame }
e lse if (acpodid(expectac) = dlpodnum) th e n
call RDIDNLNK;
else
r e tu r n  RDI
end
F ig u re  4.2.2. P sued o co d e  o f R D IT IS IN
The buffer containing all of the static data  pertaining to an exercise (i.e. aircraft type, 
podid, weapon load, etc.) is maintained for the duration of the flight. The static data 
buffer is modified only when data is received from the SOC. The static da ta  transm itted 
from the CCS to the DDS requires an acknowledge to  be received by the CCS from the 
DDS. Associated with each message is a vertical parity word (vpw) computed by the CCS 
and tagged on the last word of each message prior to transmission. The vpw is used to make
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sure data  transmission were error free. The vpw is computed by taking the exclusive-or of 
all the words in the entire message.
The legal configuration of the static buffer is when the vpw, the last word in each 
message, is equal to the exclusive-or of all the words in that particular message for every 
message in the static buffer.
Once the DDS receives the message it then computes its own vpw and compares it to 
the one tagged on the tail of the message. If it is the same an acknowledge is sent to the 
CCS and the data  in the message is unpacked and used by the DDS. If not, no acknowledge 
is returned to the CCS and the data is discarded by the DDS.
The CCS will continue to retransmit the data every 1 0 0 msec until a acknowledge for 
the particular message is received or until it has been retransm itted three times. If after 
the third retransmission the DDS does not acknowledge receipt, the CCS will bail out and 
discontinue trying to send that message.
We have written pseudocode for one of the routines to show how it is possible for the 
system to get hung in a state where, due to some transient error, the DDS will never respond 
with an acknowledge (see Figure 4.2.3). This would happen when, after the computing of 
the vpw for a static data message, an error occurred causing some of the data within the 
message to be corrupted. Currently, the only time the vpw is computed by the CCS for 
static data messages is when data is received from the SOC. So, at this time the vpw would 
not reflect the data which is in the message. So, when a DDS comes on-line, the static data 
buffer automatically transm itted to that particular CPU, by the CCS, will be incorrect and 
the vpw computed by the DDS on the  static data message will not match the one computed 
by the CCS. It is at this point that the system would be considered functioning improperly. 
Considering the worst case, the effect would be no aircraft nor aircraft data  displayed on 
the DDS console. This demonstrates yet another weakness in the existing real-time system.
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su b ro u tin e  DDOCHK
global var ackcyc, rsend, resend, msgack;
param eter (acktot =  8 , ackerr =  2 );
begin
for i = 1 , acktot { loop through msgs expected to be acked } 
if (msgack(dds,i) =  0 ) then  { no ack expected for msg i } 
ackcyc(dds,i) := 0 ; { reset frame counter } 
rsend(dds,i) := 1 ; { reset cycle counter } 
resend(i) := false { set to indicate no retrans necessary }
else
ackcyc(dds,i) := ackcyc(dds,i) +  1 ;
if ((msgack(dds,i) =  ackerr) V (ackcyc(dds,i) >  10)) th e n  
{ ack with invalid msg num recvd or ack not recvd within cycle ( 1 0 0 msec) } 
rsend(dds,i) := rsend(dds.i) -f 1
if  (rsend(dds,i) > 3) then { 3 retransmissions unsuccessful } 
for j =  1 , acktot { bail out } 
ackcyc(dds,j) := 0 ; 
msgack(dds,j) := 0 ; 
rsend(dds,j) := 1 ; 
resend(j) := false 
endfor
else { set flags for retransmission }
msgack(dds,i) := 1 ; { set to ack pending } 
ackcyc(dds,i) := 0 ; 
resend(i) := true; 
endfor { outer for }
end
Figure 4 .2 .3 . Psuedocode o f  D D O C H K
When dealing with dynamic data being passed to the DDS the problem mentioned above 
cannot possibly occur for two reasons: 1) Dynamic messages need not be acknowledged by 
the DDS and 2) the vpw is computed for every message every cycle (100msec) prior to 
transmission.
Surprisingly enough, the remainder of variables in the system which could cause prob­
lems similar to those mentioned previously are either reinitialized or recomputed prior to 
use within each frame or cycle of the system. Besides, with self-stabilization, as we will 
show in the next section, initialization is unnecessary for proper protocol execution.
We have shown how erroneous values in the transm it tables can cause the loss of valid 
aircraft downlink data. We also described how erroneous values in the static buffer can 
severely hamper the ability of the DDS to display the correct data, or worst case, any of
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the data at all. In the following section we will introduce an approach, self-stabilization, 
which will overcome such faults from within a finite period of time.
4.3 Self-Stabilizing V ersion
In order to correct the transmit tables in the event of erroneous values being written in 
them, we need to add some checks and a call to a subroutine in RDITISIN. When we have 
the case where the podid of the expected aircraft to downlink does not match the downlinked 
podid, we must consider the possibility tha t the transmit table(s) could be corrupted. So, 
we should request the SOC to retransm it the participant data. Doing so will create new 
tables as well as reassign correct values to the variables and arrays used to store participant 
data. The latter is important to know because they too are subject to erroneous values 
caused by transient errors, 
su b ro u tin e  RDITISIN
global va r dxmtable, cycframe, acpodid, dlpodnum, tisin; 
local v a r expectac; 
p a ra m e te r  (hap = 6 ) 
begin
expectac := dxmtable(cycfram) ; { store expected aircraft id from table } 
dlpodnum := tisin(2 ,tinbuf) ; { store downlinked pod id }
if ((expectac = 0)A(cycfram in [10,20,30,40])) th e n  { calibration frame }
elseif (acpodid(expectac) =  dlpodnum) th e n
ok := CORRUP(expectac); { true if uxmtable and dxmtable match 
if  (-' ok) th e n
call SOCRET(hap); 






r e tu rn  RDI
end
F ig u re  4.3.1. P su ed o co d e  o f m odified  R D IT IS IN
Theorem 4-3.1. The modified R D ITISIN  in figure 4-3.1 will force the transmit tables to 
converge to the legal configuration P i,  correcting any erroneous values stored in variables 
and arrays associated with static participant data, in a finite amount of time regardless of 
the initial configuration.
P ro o f: In order to prove Theorem 4.3.1 we must consider all possible errors which could 
occur, show that they will cause the first two checks of RDITISIN to fail resulting in a call 
to SOCRET, and show how a retransmission of the high activity participant data message 
will eventually correct the error.
In the following descriptions of cases, if an erroneous value is not mentioned for a 
particular table, variable, or array then it is assumed the values in these objects are correct.
Case 1 (erroneous value stored in the variable expectac): This error could have occurred 
due to either an erroneous value in eye fram  or dxmtable. Suppose the erroneous value of 
expectac is 0. We check to see if expectac was derived from an expected calibration frame 
position within dxmtable. If not, SOCRET is called. If expectac is non zero, a call will 
be made to SOCRET since the pod id check will fail. The erroneous value could also have 
appeared due to a transient error occurring after expectac was assigned a value from the 
transmit table but before the check. This too will result in a call to SOCRET.
Case 2(erroneous value stored in the variable dlpodnum): This error could have occurred 
due to an erroneous value in tisin  or t inbu f.  Either case will result in a call to SOCRET. 
It could also be the case, as in the Case 1 , where a correct value was modified between its 
initial assignment and the comparison. This too will cause SOCRET to be called.
Case 3(erroneous value stored in the array acpodid): It is straightforward to see that 
this will result in the failure of the podid check and thus a call to SOCRET will be made.
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Case 4 (no erroneous values stored however a downlink from a participant was received 
out of order): This occurs very seldom under normal operations but considering it is m anda­
tory. This error will result in a call to SOCRET since determining whether its a valid podid 
downlinked in the wrong frame or an actual erroneous value cause by a perturbance is not 
possible.
Realize that it is possible that erroneous values may not be discovered by the checks 
in RDITISIN on the first pass. For example, suppose the downlink transmit table was 
corrupted and the element which should contain participant position 1 contains participant 
position 2. However, we receive unexpected downlink from participant 2 when we should be 
receiving downlink from participant 1 according to the current cycle and frame. In this case, 
RDIDNLNK would be called when it should not be because there is actually an error in the 
transmit table. This will not be overlooked continuously because the correct participant 
for the cycle/frame will resume downlinking at its correct time provided no error occurs 
in the uplink transm it table. If there is an error in the uplink table it will be found by 
the CORRUP function. If not, then the error will be found by the podid check anyway. 
This was not explored in the above case analysis because eventually the aircraft expected 
to respond to the uplink transm itted 300msec prior will be the one to downlink data. At 
that point, one of the four cases above would then apply or CORRUP would have found an 
error in uxmtable  resulting in a call to SOCRET. □
The above cases cover the entire spectrum of possible errors which could hinder CCS/TIS 
coordination. By calling SOCRET, the SOC will retransm it the high activity participant 
data message causing the CCS to update its transmit tables, variables, and arrays used to 
store the static da ta  associated with participants including the array acpodid.
SOCRET will not impose any timing problems since the only thing it will do is notify 
the SOC to  send data. The SOC, upon receiving the notification, will respond in the same 
manner as if the operator had executed a send  command on the participant data. This 
command is normally done throughout the mission, periodically by the operator, to update 
the CCS static da ta  buffer with information on the new participants arriving on the range. 
Currently the CCS accepts this input from the SOC as described above, it is on this basis 
that we can state that forcing retransmission of participant data will not disrupt normal
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operation of the system.
In order to correct the static data buffer in the event of erroneous values being written 
into them after the computation of the vpw in each of the static messages, we need to 
modify DDOCHK. Instead of immediately bailing out after retransmission of a static data 
message three times unsuccessfully, we recompute the vertical parity of the message being 
transmitted by the CCS and compare it with the vpw currently stored in the message. If 
the recomputed vpw is the same, we send an error message to the DDS and bail since there 
is a definite (non transient) communication problem. If it is different, we call SOCRET 
with argument i denoting message i. 
su b ro u tin e  DDOCHK
global v a r ackcyc, rsend, resend, msgack, error; 
p a ra m e te r  (acktot =  8 , ackerr = 2 ); 
begin
for i = 1 , acktot { loop through msgs expected to be acked } 
if  (msgack(dds,i) =  0 ) th e n  { no ack expected for msg i } 
ackcyc(dds,i) := 0 ; { reset frame counter } 
rsend(dds,i) := 1 ; { reset cycle counter } 
resend(i) := false { set to indicate no retrans necessary }
else
ackcyc(dds,i) := ackcyc(dds,i) +  1 ;
if  ((msgack(dds,i) =  ackerr) V (ackcyc(dds,i) > 10)) th e n  
{ ack with invalid msg num recvd or ack not recvd within cycle ( 1 0 0 msec) } 
rsend(dds,i) := rsend(dds,i) +  1
if  (rsend(dds,i) > 3) th e n  { possible parity error in trans. of msg i } 
error := COMPUTVPW(i)
{ true if vpw does not represent data in msg } 
if  ( error) th e n
call SOCRET(i)
else
{ send error msg to DDS indicating link failure then bail out } 
fo r j =  1 , acktot { bail out } 
ackcyc(dds,j) := 0 ; 
msgack(dds,j) := 0 ; 
rsend(ddsj) := 1 ; 
resend(j) := false 
en d fo r
else { set flags for retransmission }
msgack(dds,i) := 1 ; { set to ack pending } 
ackcyc(dds,i) := 0 ; 
resend(i) := true; 
end fo r { outer fo r }
end
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F ig u re  4 .3.2. P su ed o co d e  o f  m odified  D D O C H K
Theorem 4-3.2. The modified DDOCHK in figure 4-3.2 will force the static data messages 
to converge to a legal configuration in a finite time regardless of the initial configuration.
P roof: Let msgi denote the arbitrary static data message corrupted due to some tran­
sient error in the system. The vertical parity word of that message will no longer correctly 
represent the contents of that message. So upon transmission of msgi to a DDS, the DDS will 
continuously compute a different vpw than the one in the message resulting in rsend(dds,i) 
becoming greater than 3. At this time, the function COMPUTVPW will be called with 
argument i. If the vpw computed by COMPUTVPW  matches the vpw currently stored in 
msgi, COMPUTVPW returns false and an error message is sent to the DDS indicating a 
communication problem. If the vpw computed by COMPUTVPW doesn’t match, COM­
PUTVPW  returns true and SOCRET is called with argument i. Upon receipt of msgi from 
the SOC, the CCS will store the data  in the static data buffer and recompute the vpw for 
msgi. After which, msgi will be in a legal configuration since its vpw will represent the 
contents of the message.
Notice that even if the variables involved in the if  checks are erroneous, SOCRET will be 
called within afinite amount ofiterations of DDOCHK. This is trueexcept for the case of the 
array msgack. It is possible that an erroneous value of zero may be stored in any element i of 
msgack. In which case, the DDS will never get the static data message msgi. So, it appears 
that the modified DDOCHK isn’t self-stabilizing. We need to modify a subroutine called 
DDOLOPRI(called every 100msec), which normally calls the appropriate routine to pack 
the static data message in the buffer to be passed only when changes have been received 
from the SOC, to iteratively loop through all static messages and pack a static message 
every time regardless if a change occurred or not to the data within that message. This 
will cause the msgack array to be corrected when DDOLOPRI calls subroutinei responsible 
for packing msgi in the output buffer, since msgack(i) will be set to 1 by that subroutine 
indicating an acknowledgement is pending. The protocols presented in [13] would not have 
been self-stabilizing without this liveliness property either, as explained in that paper. □
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This chapter has demonstrated that self-stabilization can be applied to a real-time sys­
tem. By adding some checks and subroutines we have shown how the existing real-time 
system can be modified to be more robust and fault tolerant than the existing model. No 
longer will the protocol be vulnerable to erroneous values appearing in the transmit tables 
or the static data buffer. The modified self-stabilizing version is able to detect the error(s) 
and converge to a legal configuration in a finite amount of time without the need for user 
intervention.
To fully implement the changes explored in this chapter it would also be necessary 
to modify the SOC software to respond to retransmit requests made by the CCS. This 
modification would entail an additional subroutine in the SOC to unpack the request. Since 
the CCS currently acknowledges receipt of participant data from the SOC we already have 
the full-duplex communication necessary to send the request to the SOC.
Because of the many applications of real-time computing, from robotics to utility control 
systems, the need for fault-tolerance is becoming more and more evident as the ramifications 
of erroneous values caused by transient errors become more severe. Self-stabilization is 
proving to be a viable means for providing that fault-tolerance.
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C h ap ter 5
C O N C L U SIO N
A distributed system consists of a set of loosely connected machines. These machines 
communicate with each other through shared memory and/or message passing in order 
to achieve a common goal. Due to reconfiguration, coordination loss or mode change the 
processors may cause the global system state to become illegal and lose the ability to achieve 
this common goal. Self-stabilization allows the system to regain coordination between its 
processors in the event of such a fault. A system is said to be self-stabilizing iff starting from 
some global state, legal or illegal, the system will converge to a legal state automatically 
and in a finite number of steps.
Self-stabilization has been applied to a number of areas since its introduction in 1974 
by Dijkstra. This thesis applied self-stabilization to the X.25 network protocol and a hard 
real-time system known as the RFMDS.
Chapter 2 presented a self-stabilizing version of the X.25 communication protocol. All 
that was examined was the connection management aspect of the protocol. The original 
protocol required the system (sender, receiver, and channels) to be properly initialized. The 
necessity of the initialization is shown by an example which gives a  cycle of states which 
do not satisfy the legal states of the protocol. The self-stabilizing version does not need an 
initialized system. If the channels contain too many or the wrong messages, the system will 
converge to a state where there is a t most one message between the sender and receiver (a 
request or a reply).
The self-stabilizing version of the protocol can tolerate errors such as processor or link 
failures and restarts. This fault tolerance makes the self-stabilizing version of the protocol
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more robust than the original version.
Chapter 3 presented a self-stabilizing version of the flow control aspect of the X.25 
communication protocol. The original protocol required the system (sender, receiver, and 
channels) to be properly initialized. The necessity of the initialization is shown by an 
example which gives a cycle of states which does not satisfy the legal states of the protocol. 
This self-stabilizing version does not need an initialized system either.
The non self-stabilizing sample protocol given in [13] was unrealistic in its simplicity. 
This chapter has shown that a real world application of the sliding window is implemented 
to be substantially more fault tolerant initially. This is why our self-stabilizing protocol 
has only slight modifications over the existing X.25 flow control protocol. Also, the self- 
stabilizing protocol presented in [13] will fall victim to the counterexample given in 3.2.2. 
It too will terminate improperly in the state 6 4 .
Once again, the self-stabilizing protocol was proven to be more robust and fault tolerant 
than the original protocol via the convergence stair method.
Chapter 4 has demonstrated that self-stabilization can be applied to a real-time system. 
By adding some checks and subroutines we have shown how the existing real-time system 
can be modified to be more robust and fault tolerant than the existing model. No longer will 
the protocol be vulnerable to erroneous values appearing in the transm it tables or the static 
data buffer. The modified self-stabilizing version is able to detect the error(s) and converge 
to a legal configuration in a finite amount of time without the need for user intervention.
Future research involves completely self-stabilizing the X.25 network protocol by incor­
porating the D T E  to D T E / D C E  interfacing modules and stabilizing them as well. In 
addition, self-stabilizing a number of well-known network protocols such as T C P /IP  and 
Ethernet for example, hold much promise. By making these protocols self-stabilizing, they 
will become more reliable and thus more desirable to be used as the interprocess communi­
cation protocols.
With the growing applications of real-time systems in the medical and scientific disci­
plines, self-stabilizing these systems will improve confidence in the system’s data integrity 
and, in turn, improve system usefulness.
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Lastly, any system in which the ability to well-define the set of legal states is present, 
can be modified to be self-stabilizing.
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